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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many empirical studies have shown that expected utility theory (EU), in particular its crucial
independence axiom, does not provide an accurate description of people’s actual choice behav-
ior. This evidence has motivated researchers to develop alternative more ﬂexible models. One
prominent class of these alternatives is rank-dependent utility (RDU), which was introduced
by Quiggin (1981, 1982), and which is the basis of prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman
1992, Luce and Fishburn 1991).2
Most derivations of RDU require some structural richness on the set of consequences because
the proposed preference conditions focus on the derivation of continuous cardinal utility. In
those approaches the weighting functions are obtained as a bonus. In this paper we follow the
traditional approach put forward by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) by focusing on the
structure naturally oﬀered by the probability interval, and we provide preference conditions
that focus on the derivation of the probability weighting function. Typical for this approach is
that cardinal utility is obtained as a bonus.
Axiomatizations of general RDU, without invoking any structural assumptions on the set
of consequences, have been provided by Nakamura (1995) and more recently by Abdellaoui
(2002) and Zank (2004). In these approaches the weighting function is unrestricted. Empirical
evidence, however, suggests a particular pattern for probability weighting: small probabilities
are overweighted while large ones are underweighted. Speciﬁcp a r a m e t r i cf o r m sh a v eb e e n
proposed in the literature to accommodate these features. Some involve a single parameter
(Karmarkar 1978, 1979, R¨ oell 1987, Currim and Sarin 1989, Tversky and Kahneman 1992,
Luce, Mellers and Chang 1993, Hey and Orme 1994, Safra and Segal 1998) while others use
2Because prospect theory comes down to RDU if consequences are of the same sign (that is either all gains
or all losses), the arguments presented in this paper apply to prospect theory as well.
2two or more parameters (Bell 1985, Goldstein and Einhorn 1987, Currim and Sarin 1989,
Lattimore Baker and Witte 1992, Prelec 1998). A recent experimental investigation of various
parametric weighting functions by Stott (2006) favors the variant of Prelec (1998).
Despite the large interest in parametric speciﬁcations for the weighting function under RDU,
little research has been invested in the axiomatic foundation of testable preference conditions in
the RDU framework with general lotteries. There exist, however, several recent foundations re-
stricted to binary lotteries where one consequence is the zero payoﬀ (see e.g. Luce 2000, Narens
1996, Luce 2001, Acz´ el and Luce 2006, al-Nowaihi and Sanjit Dhami 2006). The motivation
for restricting the analysis to binary lotteries stems from the descriptive shortcomings of the
independence conditions required to derive RDU for general lotteries (for a review see Marley
and Luce 2005). Additionally, once cardinal utility is derived, RDU for binary lotteries can be
reduced to a simple and tractable multiplicative form. However, this approach rests on addi-
tional technical assumptions. Indeed, all preference foundations we are aware of require a rich
topological structure for the set of consequences (Safra and Segal 1998, Prelec 1998, Gonzalez
and Wu 1999). This means that those models cannot immediately be adopted to many real
world applications because the set of consequences may lack such additional structure (e.g.,
health). As a consequence, it is unclear how to extend the existing preference foundations and,
therefore, it is unclear whether these models remain valid for general outcomes.
Our goal is to derive parametric weighting functions by employing behavioral conditions.
The preference foundations presented in this paper apply to general sets of consequences, which
makes the resulting models generally applicable. Except for weak ordering and continuity, the
properties that we propose are all implied by thei n d e p e n d e n c ea x i o m .F o ri n s t a n c e ,w er e t a i n
stochastic dominance and, in line with all rank-dependent theories, we assume comonotonic
independence. These two implications ensure additive separability. But further assumptions
3on preferences are required to derive the separation of probability weights and utility. In fact,
by focusing on speciﬁc functional forms for the weighting functions, the preference conditions
that characterize these forms deliver this latter separation free of charge. This is an important
diﬀerence compared to the afore mentioned derivations.
Speciﬁc implications of the independence axiom have been analyzed before and, although
the focus has not been on the weighting function under RDU, there are some common aspects
underlying those preference conditions and the ones proposed in this paper. Machina (1989)
distinguished two properties, termed mixture separability and replacement separability, respec-
tively. Mixture separability demands that the preference between two lotteries is invariant to
mixing them with a common degenerate lottery. Replacement separability holds if the prefer-
ence between two lotteries remains unaﬀected when in both lotteries a common consequence
with identical probability is replaced by any diﬀerent consequence. We explore the implications
of these separability conditions within our rank-dependent framework, where we have to restrict
these conditions. It turns out that our restricted conditions can be employed to characterize
RDU with a power weighting function and RDU with a linear or an exponential weighting
function.
However, the separability conditions are descriptively problematic. For example, they are
violated by the two famous paradoxes of Allais (1953). More precisely, the common ratio eﬀect
constitutes a direct violation of our version of mixture separability that generates the power
weighting function, while the common consequence eﬀect provides a violation of our version
of replacement separability. More generally, because the afore mentioned weighting functions
each involve a single parameter, they cannot accommodate at the same time probabilistic
risk seeking and probabilistic risk aversion within the probability interval. That is, they are
incompatible with the inverse-S shaped form, concave for small probabilities and convex for
4large probabilities, that received extensive empirical support (e.g., Camerer and Ho 1994, Wu
and Gonzalez 1996, Tversky and Fox 1995, Gonzalez and Wu 1999, Abdellaoui 2000, Bleichrodt
and Pinto 2000, Kilka and Weber 2001, Abdellaoui, Vossmann and Weber 2005).
To accommodate mixed probabilistic risk attitudes, we need to relax the previous preference
conditions further, namely to hold only on speciﬁc subsets of the probability interval. This way,
we can provide foundations for inverse-S shaped weighting functions under RDU, which are
entirely based on behavioral preference conditions that do not require additional structural
assumptions on the set of consequences.
Our analysis of inverse-S shaped weighting functions focuses on functional forms that may
involve three parameters. One parameter describes the probabilistic risk attitudes for small
probabilities while a second one describes such attitudes for large probabilities. The role of
the third parameter is to separate the region of probabilistic risk aversion from the region
of probabilistic risk seeking. As it turns out, these parametric forms are in agreement with
the interpretation of modeling sensitivity towards changes from impossibility and certainty, as
proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In particular, the parameters can be used to
measure the degrees of sensitivity, and to quantify the relative sensitivity between certainty
and impossibility.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 general notation and preliminary
results are presented. We indicate how the results of Wakker (1993) and Chateauneuf and
Wakker (1993) can be used to derive additive separability, the latter property being a common
point of departure for all our models. Next, we proceed with a separation of the independence
axiom of EU into speciﬁc variants of the separability conditions proposed by Machina (1989). In
Section 3 we analyze mixture separability restricted to worst consequences, and in Section 4 we
analyze replacement separability restricted to best and worst consequences. Section 5 analyses
5the implications of mixture separability now restricted to the best consequence. Finally, in
Section 6 we provide results for parametric inverse-S shaped probability weighting functions
and Section 7 concludes. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Let X denote the set of consequences. For simplicity of exposition, we assume a ﬁnite set of
consequences, such that X = {x0,...,x n} for n ≥ 3. A lottery is a ﬁnite probability distri-
bution over the set X. It is represented by P =( ˜ p0,x 0;...;˜ pn,x n) meaning that probability
˜ pj is assigned to consequence xj ∈ X,f o rj =0 ,...,n.L e t L denote the set of all lotter-
ies. A preference relation < is assumed over L, and its restriction to subsets of L (e.g., all
degenerate lotteries) is also denoted by <.T h e s y m b o l Â denotes strict preference while ∼
denotes indiﬀerence. We assume that no two consequences in X are indiﬀerent, and further,
that consequences are ordered from worst to best, i.e., x0 ≺ ···≺ xn.
In this paper we present several preference conditions which become more transparent if
formulated for decumulative distributions instead of lotteries. With this in mind we can identify
lotteries with their corresponding decumulative probability distribution through the mapping
P 7→ (p1,...,p n),
where pj =
Pn
i=j ˜ pi denotes the likelihood of getting at least xj, j =1 ,...,n.A s t h e s e t o f
consequences is ﬁxed we have simpliﬁed the notation above by suppressing the consequences
and by noting that the worst consequence x0 always has decumulative probability equal to 1.
Therefore, the set of lotteries L is identiﬁed with the set {(p1,...,p n):1≥ p1 ≥ ···≥ pn ≥ 0},
which consists of probability tuples that are rank-ordered from highest to lowest.
In what follows we provide preference conditions for < in order to represent the preference
6relation over L by a function V .T h a ti s ,V is a mapping from L into the set of real numbers,
IR, such that for all P,Q ∈ L,
P < Q ⇔ V (P) ≥ V (Q).
This necessarily implies that < must be a weak order, i.e. < is complete (P < Q or P 4 Q for
all P,Q ∈ L)a n dtransitive (P < Q and Q < R implies P < R for all P,Q,R ∈ L).
T h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o ns a t i s ﬁes (probability-wise) monotonicity if P Â Q whenever pj ≥ qj
for all j =1 ,...,n and P 6= Q. The preference relation < satisﬁes Jensen-continuity on the
set of lotteries L if for all lotteries P Â Q and R there exist ρ,µ ∈ (0,1) such that
ρP +( 1− ρ)R Â Q and P Â µR +( 1− µ)Q.
A monotonic weak order that satisﬁes Jensen-continuity on L also satisﬁes the stronger Euclidean-
continuity on L (see Abdellaoui 2002, Lemma 18). We can then invoke a classical result of
Debreu (1954) to derive the following statement:
Theorem 1 Assume that the preference relation < on the set of decumulative distributions
L is a Jensen-continuous monotonic weak order. Then there exists a continuous function V :
L → IR, strictly increasing in each decumulative probability, that represents <. The function
V is unique up to strictly increasing continuous transformations. ¤
Next, we focus on two forms of separability properties. The ﬁrst property will ensure that
the function in Theorem 1 is additively separable. The second family of properties is concerned
with the separation of utility and probability w e i g h t i n g ,a n di sd i s c u s s e di nt h es u b s e q u e n t
sections.
To derive additive separability we require independence of common decumulative probabili-
ties. To deﬁne this property we introduce some useful notation. For i ∈ {1,...,n}, P ∈ L and
7α ∈ [0,1], we denote by αiP the distribution that agrees with P except that pi is replaced by
α. Whenever this notation is used it is implicitly assumed that pi−1 ≥ α ≥ pi+1 (respectively,
α ≥ pi+1 if i =1a n dpi−1 ≥ α if i = n) to ensure that αiP ∈ L. Similarly, for I ⊂ {1,...,n}
we write αIP for the distribution that agrees with P except that pi is replaced by α for i ∈ I,
whenever the probabilities in αIP are ranked from highest to lowest.
The preference relation < satisﬁes comonotonic independence if αiP < αiQ ⇔ βiP < βiQ
for all αiP,αiQ,βiP,βiQ ∈ L.
Comonotonic independence is a weak form of replacement separability as analyzed in Machina
(1989). Recall that replacement separability demands that the preference between two lotteries
is invariant when common consequences with equal probability are replaced by other com-
mon consequences. Comonotonic independence restricts replacement separability such that
when comparing two lotteries, common consequences can be replaced by other common conse-
quences only if they have a common decumulative likelihood. On reﬂection, one observes that
this restriction implies that only common consequences of adjacent rank can be replaced.
Without the comonotonicity restriction on decumulative distributions in L we could adopt
well-known results of Debreu (1960) to derive additive separability of the representing function
in Theorem 1. Deriving additive separability on rank-ordered sets is not trivially extended from
Debreu’s classical result, but invokes more complex mathematical tools. The next theorem
follows by using results of Wakker (1993) and Chateauneuf and Wakker (1993).
Theorem 2 The following two statements are equivalent for a preference relation < on L:





8with continuous strictly monotonic functions V1,...,V n :[ 0 ,1] → IR which are bounded
except maybe V1 and Vn which could be inﬁnite at extreme probabilities (i.e., at 0, or 1).
(ii) T h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o n< is a Jensen-continuous monotonic weak order that satisﬁes
comonotonic independence.
The functions V1,...,V n are jointly cardinal, that is, they are unique up to location and
common scale. ¤
In the next sections we provide preference foundations for speciﬁc rank-dependent utility
models using as common point of departure the results obtained above. Before proceeding we
recall the general form of rank-dependent utility.




w(pj)[u(xj) − u(xj−1)], (1)
where the utility function u : X → IR agrees with < on X, and the weighting function w :
[0,1] → [0,1] is strictly increasing and continuous with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. Under RDU
utility is cardinal and the weighting function is uniquely determined. If the weighting function
is linear then RDU reduces to EU.
For completenes we recall the classical preference condition leading to EU. The preference
relation < satisﬁes vNM-independence (short for von Neumann-Morgenstern independence)i f
for all P,Q,R ∈ L and all α ∈ (0,1) it holds that
P < Q ⇔ αP +( 1− α)R < αQ +( 1− α)R.
In concluding this section, note without proof, two immediate implications of vNM-independence
and weak ordering: monotonicity and comonotonic independence, which were introduced be-
fore.
93 Common Ratio Invariant Preferences
One of the diﬃculties of EU is to accommodate preferences that exhibit the common ratio
eﬀect. Allais (1953) compared the choice behavior for the following two decision problems. In
problem 1 there is the choice between the following lotteries:
A1 =( 1 ,1M)a n dB1 =( 0 .2,0M;0.8,5M),
where M denotes $-millions. In problem 2 the choice is between
A2 =( 0 .95,0M;0.05,1M)a n dB2 =( 0 .96,0M;0.04,5M).
The literature has reported (e.g. Allais 1953, MacCrimmon and Larsson 1979, Chew and
Waller 1986, Wu 1994) that a signiﬁcant majority of people exhibited a preference for A1 in
the ﬁrst choice problem and a preference for B2 in the second choice problem. Substituting EU
immediately reveals that this leads to a conﬂicting relationship.
Looking at the implications of vNM-indepen d e n c ew ec a no b s e r v et h a tc o m m o nr a t i ot y p e
behavior is not in conﬂict with monotonicity and neither with comonotonic independence. It
is a diﬀerent aspect of vNM-independence that is violated by such preferences, which gives
rise to the following property. The preference relation < satisﬁes common ratio invariance for
decumulative distributions if
(p1,...,p n) ∼ (q1,...,q n) ⇔ (αp1,...,αp n) ∼ (αq1,...,αq n),
whenever (p1,...,p n),(q1,...,q n),(αp1,...,αp n),(αq1,...,αq n) ∈ L.
Common ratio invariance for decumulative distributions says that shifting proportionally
probability mass from good consequences to the worst consequence (or doing the opposite)
leaves preferences unaﬀected.
10Common ratio invariance for decumulative distributions is a weak form of mixture separabil-
ity (Machina 1989). The latter demands that a preference between two lotteries is maintained
if each of the lotteries is mixed with any common consequence. In contrast, common ratio
invariance for decumulative distributions demands that such mixtures are only permitted if the
common consequence is the worst.
The condition has also appeared in Safra and Segal (1998), called zero-independence, where
i th a sb e e nu s e di nt h ed e r i v a t i o no fas p e c i ﬁc version of Yaari (1987)’s dual theory, namely
RDU with linear utility and power weighting function. The next result shows that the condition
is powerful enough to yield RDU-preferences with power weighting without restricting the
generality of the utility function.
Theorem 3 The following two statements are equivalent for a preference relation < on L:








with b>0, and monotonic utility function u : X → IR.
(ii) T h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o n< is a Jensen-continuous monotonic weak order that satisﬁes
comonotonic independence and common ratio invariance for decumulative distributions.
The function u is cardinal. ¤
It has previously been documented that preferences exhibiting the paradoxical common ratio
eﬀect exclude RDU preferences with power weighting. Our result above demonstrates that it
is precisely this class of RDU-preferences with power weighting, including EU-preferences, that
11cannot accommodate common ratio eﬀect preferences. That the result is very general can also
be inferred from the fact that, except for monotonicity, no further restrictions apply to utility.
4 Extreme Replacement Separability
We start in this section by reconsidering the common consequence paradox of Allais (1953), and
relate this to a new preference condition concerning the replacement of common consequences.
The common consequence paradox originates from observing behavior among the following
pairs of choice problems. In problem 3 the choice is between
A3 =( 1 ,1M)a n dB3 =( 0 .01,0M;0.89,1M;0.1,5M),
a n di np r o b l e m4t h ec h o i c ei sb e t w e e n
A4 =( 0 .89,0M;0.11,1M)a n dB4 =( 0 .9,0M;0.1,5M).
It has been observed in experiments that a signiﬁcant majority of people exhibit a preference
for A3 in the former choice problem and a preference for B4 in the latter choice problem (e.g.
Allais 1953, MacCrimmon and Larsson 1979, Chew and Waller 1986, Wu 1994, but see also
related evidence in Wakker, Erev and Weber 1994, Birnbaum and Navarette 1998, Birnbaum
2004). If one writes the previous lotteries as decumulative distributions over consequences 0,
1M,a n d5 M, then one can immediately see that A4 =( 0 .11,0) and A3 = A4 +( 0 .89,0), and
that B4 =( 0 .1,0.1) and B3 = B4 +( 0 .89,0). Clearly, exhibiting initially A3 Â B3 together
with a second preference A4 ≺ B4 directly violates vNM-independence but not monotonicity
and neither comonotonic independence.
In the common consequence paradox the interpretation is that people are sensitive to re-
placing the good common consequence of getting “1 Million with probability 0.89” with a bad
12common consequence of getting “0 with probability 0.89.” Therefore, also replacement sepa-
rability (Machina 1989) is violated. Although empirically it has to be veriﬁed, we think that
such sensitivity would also be exhibited when the best consequence is replaced by the worst
consequence, which leads to the folowing property. The preference relation < satisﬁes extreme
replacement separability if
(p1,...,p n) ∼ (q1,...,q n) ⇔ (p1 + α,...,p n + α) ∼ (q1 + α,... ,qn + α),
whenever (p1,...,p n),(q1,...,q n),(p1 + α,... ,pn + α),(q1 + α,... ,qn + α) ∈ L.
The following theorem shows that for RDU-preferences the only weighting functions that
are able to accommodate extreme replacement separability are linear or exponential ones.
Theorem 4 The following two statements are equivalent for a preference relation < on L:
(i) T h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o n< on L is either represented by expected utility, or it is represented







with c 6=0 , and monotonic utility function u : X → IR.
(ii) T h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o n< is a Jensen-continuous monotonic weak order that satisﬁes
comonotonic independence and extreme replacement separability.
The function u is cardinal. ¤
Note that RDU-preferences satisfying both common ratio invariance for decumulative dis-
tributions and extreme replacement separability can only be represented by EU. This follows
i m m e d i a t e l yb yo b s e r v i n gt h a tt h eo n l yp o s s i b l e weighting function that is common in Theorems
3 and 4 is the linear weighting function w(p)=p.
135A D u a l A n a l y s i s
The properties considered in the previous sections can easily be formulated for cumulative
distributions. Jensen-continuity, monotonicity, comonotonic independence, and also extreme
replacement separability have mathematically equivalent counterparts which are obtained by
simply replacing the decumulative distributions by the corresponding cumulative ones. How-
ever, doing the same for the afore mentioned common ratio invariance property leads to a
diﬀerent but closely related property. This can be inferred from the corresponding RDU-
representation with a weighting function that is the dual of a power function (see Theorem 5
below).
Before we formulate this new property we note that if a lottery is written as a decumulative
distribution P =( p1,...,p n) then writing the same lottery as a cumulative distribution results
in ˜ P =( 1− p1,...,1 − pn). The diﬀerence in the latter notation lies in the interpretation
of the cumulative probability 1 − pi, which now refers the likelihood of getting at most xi−1,
i =1 ,...,n, whereas the decumulative probability pi was associated with the consequences xi,
i =1 ,...,n.W ed e n o t eb y˜ L the set of cumulative distributions.
The preference relation < satisﬁes common ratio invariance for cumulative distributions if
(1 − p1,...,1 − pn) ∼ (1 − q1,...,1 − qn)
⇔
(α(1 − p1),...,α(1 − pn)) ∼ (α(1 − q1),...,α(1 − qn)),
whenever (1−p1,...,1−pn),(1−q1,...,1−qn),(α(1−p1),...,α(1−pn)),(α(1−q1),...,α(1−
qn)) ∈ ˜ L.
This variant of common ratio invariance, which says that shifting probability mass propor-
tionally from all consequences to the best consequence leaves preferences unaﬀected, is also
14a weak form of mixture separability (Machina 1989). We get the following analog result to
Theorem 3.
Theorem 5 The following two statements are equivalent for a preference relation < on L:





[1 − (1 − pj)
d][u(xj) − u(xj−1)],
with d>0, and monotonic utility function u : X → IR.
(ii) T h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o n< is a Jensen-continuous monotonic weak order that satisﬁes
comonotonic independence and common ratio invariance for cumulative distributions.
The function u is cardinal. ¤
Note that, similarly to the arguments presented at the end of the previous section, RDU-
preferences satisfying both common ratio invariance for cumulative distributions and extreme
replacement separability can only be represented by EU. Also, RDU-preferences satisfying both
common ratio invariance properties must be EU-preferences.
6 Inverse-S shaped Weighting Functions
The parametric forms derived in the previous sections are somewhat inﬂexible in modeling
probabilistic risk attitudes. Such risk attitudes are reﬂected in the curvature of the probability
weighting function (see Chew, Karni and Safra 1987, Yaari 1987, Chateauneuf and Cohen 1994,
Wakker 1994, Abdellaoui 2002, Chateauneuf, Cohen and Meilijson 2004). The afore mentioned
RDU-preferences either exhibit exclusively probabilistic risk aversion (i.e., a convex weighting
15function) or exclusively probabilistic risk seeking (i.e., a concave weighting function) through-
out the probability interval. That is, in Theorem 3 either the parameter b>1( w convex) or
b<1( w concave); in Theorem 4 either c>0( w convex) or c<0( w concave); and in Theorem
5 either the parameter d<1( w convex) or d>1( w concave). While there is theoretical
interest in overall convex/concave probability weighting, empirical ﬁndings suggest that a com-
bination of probabilistic risk seeking for small probabilities and probabilistic risk aversion for
large probabilities is an appropriate way of modeling sensitivity towards probabilities. Because
the concave region for small probabilities is followed smoothly by a convex region for larger
probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Tversky and Fox 1995, Wu and Gonzalez 1996,
Abdellaoui 2000), such weighting functions are referred to as inverse-S shaped.
A few parametric forms have been proposed for inverse-S shaped weighting functions (Kar-
markar 1978, 1979, Goldstein and Einhorn 1987, Currim and Sarin 1989, Lattimore, Baker
and Witte 1992, Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Prelec 1998), and their parameters have been
estimated in many empirical studies (Camerer and Ho 1994, Tversky and Fox 1995, Wu and
Gonzalez 1996, Gonzalez and Wu 1999, Abdellaoui 2000, Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000, Kilka and
Weber 2001, Etchart-Vincent 2004, Abdellaoui, Vossmann and Weber 2005). Most of these
parametric forms lack an appropriate axiomatic underpinning. This is problematic because
it is unclear what kind of preference condition must be assumed to generate such weighting
functions, and therefore, it is unclear what kind of behavioral properties are captured within a
speciﬁc parametric family of weighting functions.
Axiomatizations have been proposed for the class of weighting functions introduced by Pr-
elec (1998) (see also Luce 2001, Acz´ el and Luce 2006). The class introduced by Goldstein and
Einhorn (1987) has been discussed in Gonzalez and Wu (1999), where necessary preference con-
ditions have been proposed. In the axiomatic derivation of these families of weighting functions
16it is necessary to assume a rich set of consequences, and further, the representing functional
must also be continuous with respect to consequences. From an empirical point of view, this
dependence on consequences is a demanding restriction. A further restrictive point in these
axiomatizations is that a representing functional, where the continuous utility is already sepa-
rated from probability weighting, must be assumed prior to invoking the additional invariance
property that generates the required parametric form. An open and from an empirical point of
view important question is whether, on their own, those characterizing properties are powerful
enough to induce such a separation once additive separability as given in Theorem 2 has been
derived.
Recall that the results presented in the previous sections are free of restrictions on the
richness of the set of consequences, and also free of additional separability conditions that
ensure RDU to hold prior to invoking the invariance properties. But note at the same time
that these preference conditions are too rigid to permit inverse-S shaped probability weighting
functions under RDU. We would like to have both preference conditions for general consequences
and also axiomatizations that allow for inverse-S shaped weighting functions under RDU. In
what follows we propose such preference conditions, and show that these lead to new families
of parametric weighting functions.
To derive RDU with inverse-S shaped weighting functions we restrict the preference condi-
tions presented in Sections 3—5 to hold only on speciﬁc intervals of probabilities. An analogous
approach for general, non-parametric weighting functions and capacities was pursued by Tver-
sky and Wakker (1995) and Wakker (2001). This seems to be a reasonable compromise because,
as we show below, these conditions are still powerful enough to separate utility from probability
weighting if additive separability holds, that is, if they are added in statement (ii) of Theorem
2. The idea, in line with the empirical evidence, is to impose a ﬁrst invariance condition for
17distributions involving small probabilities and a second invariance property for distributions
involving large probabilities. This will then give suﬃcient ﬂexibility in deriving the required
weighting functions. However, as we indicate in the next subsection, some unwarranted features
relating to the utility functions may occur.
6.1 Switch-power Weighting Functions
The results presented in this subsection focus on the class of weighting functions which are





cpa, if p 6 ˆ p,
1 − d(1 − p)b, if p>ˆ p,
with the parameters involved as discussed below. We call these functions switch-power weighting
functions.
We presented the function above with ﬁve parameters a,b,c,d and ˆ p. However, these reduce
to four because of continuity of w on [0,1], and if diﬀerentiability at ˆ p is assumed, which seems
plausible in this context, a reduction to three parameters is obtained. Let us elaborate on these
reductions. Continuity at 0 implies that a>0, and monotonicity implies that c>0. Continuity
at 1 implies that b>0, and monotonicity implies that d>0. Continuity and diﬀerentiability








db(1 − ˆ p)b−1
aˆ pa−1 ,





bˆ p + a(1 − ˆ p)
¸
,
d =( 1 − ˆ p)
−b
∙
a(1 − ˆ p)
bˆ p + a(1 − ˆ p)
¸
.
If 0 <a≤ 1 the probability weighting function is concave on (0, ˆ p), and if 0 <b≤ 1i ti s
convex on (ˆ p,1), hence has an inverse-S shape. For a,b ≥ 1w eh a v eaS-shaped probability
weighting function, which is convex on (0, ˆ p) and concave on (ˆ p,1). When ˆ p approaches 1 or
0, the weighting function reduces to a power weighting function or a dual power weighting
function, respectively. Moreover, substitution of ˆ p into w gives
w(ˆ p)=
bˆ p
bˆ p + a(1 − ˆ p)
=1 −
a(1 − ˆ p)
bˆ p + a(1 − ˆ p)
,
from which one can easily derive the relationship
w(ˆ p) 6 ˆ p ⇔ b 6 a.
In particular, this shows that whenever a = b the weighting function intersects the 45◦ line
precisely at ˆ p (see Figure 1). One should also note that in this case the derivative of w at ˆ p
equals a, and therefore this parameter controls for the curvature of the weighting function. The
parameter ˆ p,h o w e v e r ,i n d i c a t e sw h e t h e rt h ei n t e r v a lf o r overweighting of probabilities is larger
than the interval for underweighting, and therefore controls for the elevation of the weighting
function (see also Gonzalez and Wu (1999) for a similar interpretation of the parameters in the
“linear in log-odds” weighting function of Goldstein and Einhorn (1987)).








Figure 1: A two parameter switch-power weighting function.
In general, when a 6= b, two parameters control for curvature. In that case ˆ p need not
demarcate the regions of over and underweighting because it may not lie on the 45◦ line. Nev-
ertheless, ˆ p will still inﬂuence elevation, however, whether there is more overweighting relative
to underweighting now also depends on the relationship between the magnitudes of the para-
meters a and b.T h e f o l l o w i n g ﬁgure depicts, for the case of an inverse-S shaped weighting
function, the two scenarios of underweighting (0 <b<a<1), respectively, overweighting
(0 <a<b<1) at ˆ p.
 
  



















Figure 2: A 3-parameter function with underweighting respectively overweighting at ˆ p.
20As it turns out, it is more appropriate to interpret these parameters as was initially pro-
posed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). All parameters may inﬂuence elevation, however,
the main role of ˆ p is to demarcate the interval of probabilistic risk aversion from the inter-
val of probabilistic risk seeking. The magnitude of the parameter a indicates diminishing (or
increasing) sensitivity to changes from impossibility to possibility. This can be inferred by
inspecting the derivative of w for probabilities in the range (0,min{ˆ p,1 − ˆ p}). Observe, that












Therefore, sensitivity increases if a>1 and decreases if a<1. Note that for a = 1 sensitivity is
constant. Note also that the right-derivative at 0,w 0(0+)=0i fa>1 and is unbounded if a<1,
the latter indicating extreme sensitivity for changes from possible to impossible. Similarly, as
one moves away from certainty, sensitivity increases if b>1 and decreases if b<1, while
for b = 1 sensitivity is constant. There is extreme sensitivity for changes from certainty to
possibility if b<1.
The switch-power weighting function also allows for a comparison of the sensitivity to
changes from 0 relative to the sensitivity to changes from 1. Considering the ratio of derivatives










Therefore, this relative sensitivity is constant when a = b, but otherwise there is more (less)
sensitivity for changes from 0 than for changes from 1 if a<b(a>b ). As q approaches
21min{ˆ p,1 − ˆ p} , the ratio w0(q)/w0(1 − q) is decreasing (increasing) towards
w0(ˆ p)





[(1 − ˆ p)/ˆ p]b−1, if ˆ p 6 1/2,
[ˆ p/(1 − ˆ p)]a−1, if ˆ p>1/2.
There are some extreme cases that should be mentioned here. Taking limits when only a
approaches 0 gives a weighting function that equals 0 at 0 and is constant equal to 1 on (0,1].
Taking limits when only b approaches 0 we get a weighting function that equals 1 at 1 and
is constant equal to 0 on [0,1). These latter weighting functions do not exhibit continuity or
monotonicity, and therefore fall outside the RDU-functionals considered in this paper. Similarly,
this holds for the classes of weighting functions where a = b and a approaches 0, or when a 6= b
and either a or b approach inﬁnity.
The preference condition that is necessary for RDU with (inverse) S-shaped switch-power
weighting function is deﬁned next. Common ratio invariance (for extreme probabilities) holds
if there exists a probability ˆ p ∈ (0,1) such that
(p1,...,p n) ∼ (q1,...,q n) ⇔ (αp1,...,αp n) ∼ (αq1,...,αq n),
whenever all (p1,...,p n),(q1,...,q n),(αp1,...,αp n),(αq1,...,αq n) ∈ Lˆ p := {R ∈ L : r1 6 ˆ p}
and
(1 − p1,...,1 − pn) ∼ (1 − q1,...,1 − qn)
⇔
(β(1 − p1),...,α(1 − pn)) ∼ (β(1 − q1),...,α(1 − qn)),
whenever (1 − p1,...,1 − pn), (1 − q1,...,1 − qn), (β(1 − p1),...,β(1 − pn)), and (β(1 −
q1),...,β(1 − qn)) ∈ ˜ Lˆ p := {R ∈ ˜ L :1− rn 6 1 − ˆ p}.
Clearly common ratio invariance requires preferences to be immune to common proportional
changes in decumulative probabilities whenever these are all smaller than some ˆ p ∈ (0,1) and
22it does also require immunity of preferences to common proportional changes in cumulative
probabilities if these are all smaller than 1 − ˆ p. As the result below shows, replacing common
ratio invariance for (de)cumulative distributions in (Theorem 3) Theorem 5 with the weaker
common ratio invariance does not necessarily give RDU. As it turns out this property leads
to a more general class of preferences represented by a RDU-like functional that combines a
unique switch-power weighting function with two cardinal utility functions depending on the
evaluated distribution. We state this result before we analyze this aspect further.
Theorem 6 The following two statements are equivalent for a preference relation < on L:
(i) The preference relation < on L is represented by an additive representation as in Theorem





sj[cpa], if p 6 ˆ p,
ˆ sj[1 − d(1 − p)b], if p>ˆ p,
for some ˆ p ∈ (0,1) with a,b,c,d > 0, and positive sj, ˆ sj for all j =1 ,...,n.
(ii) T h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o n< is a Jensen-continuous monotonic weak order that satisﬁes
comonotonic independence and common ratio invariance.
The parameters ˆ p,a,b,d are uniquely determined, and c =1 /ˆ pa −d(1− ˆ p)b/ˆ pa. Further the
sj’s and the ˆ sj’s can be replaced by corresponding tsj’s and tˆ sj’s for any positive t. ¤
This theorem shows that, by making the sensitivity towards small probabilities independent
from that for large probabilities, a more general functional than RDU is obtained. However,
when we restrict to speciﬁc sets of distributions the derived representing functional still gives
RDU. We elaborate on this point next.
23Take k ∈ {0,...,n} and deﬁne L(k): ={P ∈ L : pk 6 ˆ p<p k+1}.T h e n , o n L(k)t h e





sj[cpa], if p 6 ˆ p,
ˆ sj[1 − d(1 − p)b], if p>ˆ p,
for some ˆ p ∈ (0,1) with a,b,d > 0,c=1 /ˆ pa−d(1−ˆ p)b/ˆ pa and positive sj, ˆ sj for all j =1 ,...,n.
In this case we deﬁne u(x0) = 0 and iteratively u(xj)=u(xj−1)+sj for j =1 ,...,k and











cpa, if p 6 ˆ p,
1 − d(1 − p)b, if p>ˆ p,
and strictly monotonic cardinal utility u. Hence, RDU has been obtained for < on L(k).
In general, for diﬀerent values of k, the RDU-functionals (or RDU-restrictions) may not
agree. This shows the price that we pay for further relaxing the common ratio invariance
properties of the previous sections so that they apply only on restricted sets of distributions.
An additional preference condition is now required to derive RDU for < on L.S u c ha
condition has been proposed in Zank (2004). There it was shown that, in the presence of The-
orem 2, the probabilistic consistency condition is necessary and suﬃcient to give general RDU,
hence cardinal utility, without requiring any structural assumptions on the set of consequences.
In this paper we present a version of that condition that is much weaker, and on its own not
suﬃcient to give RDU, but when added to statement (ii) of Theorem 6 above, the property
implies RDU with switch-power weighting function.
24The preference relation < satisﬁes consistency if
pI(γ,... ,γ) ∼ ˆ pI(δ,... ,δ)
and
ˆ pI(γ,... ,γ) ∼ qI(δ,...,δ)
imply
pI\{i}ˆ pi(γ,... ,γ) ∼ ˆ pI\{i}qi(δ,... ,δ),
whenever I = {1,...,i} or I = {i,...,n},i ∈ {1,...,n},a n dq<ˆ p<pare such that the
above distributions are in L.
Note that, given monotonicity and continuity, the ﬁrst two indiﬀerences can always be
derived locally. Consistency then requires that the measured indiﬀerences for consequence xi
remains valid when measured for consequence xi−1 (respectively xi+1). Under the assumptions
of Theorem 6 the condition will preclude the possibility of having two utility functions that
determine choice behavior. The next result summarizes this point.
Theorem 7 The following two statements are equivalent for a preference relation < on L:





cpa, if p 6 ˆ p,
1 − d(1 − p)b, if p>ˆ p,
for some ˆ p ∈ (0,1) with a,b,c,d > 0.
(ii) T h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o n< is a Jensen-continuous monotonic weak order that satisﬁes
comonotonic independence, common ratio invariance and consistency.
The parameters ˆ p,a,b,d are uniquely determined and c =1 /ˆ pa −d(1 − ˆ p)b/ˆ pa.F u r t h e r ,t h e
utility function u is cardinal. ¤
25Following the line of argument presented above, one can also provide axiomatic character-
izations for RDU with an analog to the switch-power weighting function that ﬁrst is a dual
power weighting function followed by a power weighting function.
6.2 The Switch-exponential Weighting Function
Let us now consider the switch-exponential weighting function.3 Exploiting continuity at 0 and





c(eap − 1), if p 6 ˆ p,
1 − d(eb − ebp), if p>ˆ p,
with ac > 0,db>0 by monotonicity, and due to continuity at ˆ p it holds that
c =
1
eaˆ p − 1
−
d(eb − ebˆ p)
eaˆ p − 1
.






which, combined with the previous expression for c, allows us to determine both c,d in terms
of a,b, and ˆ p:
c =
bebˆ p




aeaˆ p(eb − ebˆ p)+bebˆ p(eaˆ p − 1)
.
One can immediately derive the conditions for which there is diminishing (increasing) sensitivity
at 0 and 1. An inverse-S shaped weighting function is obtained if a<0a n db>0, while an
S-shaped weighting functions must have a>0a n db<0.
3We restrict our analysis to the cases that the weighting function is exponential below some parameter ˆ p
and exponential above it. As can be inferred from Theorem 4, the characterizing preference condition will allow
also for linearity below or above the parameter ˆ p.
26I nt h ec a s eo fa ni n v e r s e - S weighting function (i.e., a<0,b>0), the condition for over-
weighting at ˆ p comes down to




e−aˆ p − 1
eb(1−ˆ p) − 1
1 − ˆ p
ˆ p
.
Observe that the sensitivity to changes from impossibility is given by w0(0) = ca and the
sensitivity to changes from certainty is w0(1) = dbeb, and that both expressions must exceed
1 in order to have overweighting for small probabilities and underweighting for large ones. By







Note that in the case of an inverse-S shaped weighting function one obtains
w0(0)
w0(1)




hence, whether there is greater sensitivity at 0 compared to 1 will depend on all three parameters
a,b, and ˆ p.W ec o m p a r eh o wt h i sr e l a t i v es e n s i t i v i t ye v o l v e sa so n em o v e sa w a yf r o mt h ee x t r e m e







hence relative sensitivity increases if b>−a (decreases if b<−a), reaching its maximum
( m i n i m u m )a tm i n {ˆ p,1 − ˆ p} as follows:
e
b(2ˆ p−1), if ˆ p 6 1/2, or e
a(2ˆ p−1), if ˆ p>1/2.
An analog statement can be concluded for the case of an S-shaped weighting function. Note
that there is constant relative sensitivity if b = −a.
277 Summary
Our main objective in this paper has been to provide preference foundations for parametric
weighting functions in a general RDU framework where the set of consequences is arbitrary.
Inevitably, these preference foundations have to employ conditions that exploit the mathemat-
ical structure oﬀered by the probability interval. Initially, we have derived three classes of such
RDU-forms with a single parameter for probability weighting. In all these derivations cardinal
utility is obtained as a bonus in addition to the speciﬁcp a r a m e t r i cf o r m( p o w e r ,e x p o n e n t i a l ,
or dual power) of the weighting functions.
Building on mixture separability and replacement separability, as introduced by Machina
(1989), we characterized RDU with power, linear, and exponential weighting function. This
shows, once more, the relevance of the vNM-independence axiom and its implications in decision
theory and in particularly for the weighting functions under RDU (and prospect theory). The
power weighting function is directly related to the common ratio pattern of preferences. It
has also been pointed out that the exponential weighting function is directly related to the
common consequence pattern of preferences (Allais 1953), a somewhat surprising connection
that has not been mentioned before in the literature. The dual power weighting function has
no documented EU-paradox to be linked to, but we think that a dual analog of the common
ratio paradox of Allais can easily be constructed. However, viewed from a diﬀerent perspective,
t h ep r e f e r e n c ec o n d i t i o n st h a tg i v er i s et ot h e se weighting functions will hopefully lead to a
better understanding of how demanding EU is, and in particular how demanding the vNM-
independence axiom actually is.
The one-parameter classes of weighting functions have shortcomings for descriptive appli-
cations. In particular it not possible to separate sensitivity to changes in small probabilities
28from sensitivity to changes in large probabilities because there is a single parameter that has
to govern both. Empirical studies suggest that there is extreme sensitivity to changes from cer-
tainty or impossibility to possibility, and also that this sensitivity diminishes as one approaches
moderate probabilities. Taking account of this evidence, we have proposed to separate the prob-
ability interval into two exhaustive regions on which the preference conditions that implied the
one-parameter weighting functions still hold. Therefore, we had to specify in advance where the
boundary is that separates the intervals of distinct sensitivity to changes in probabilities, and
this boundary probability appears as one of the parameters in our weighting functions. This is
diﬀerent to the axiomatization oﬀered by Prelec (1998) and the one suggested in Gonzalez and
Wu (1999) because there the probability value that separates the regions of distinct sensitivity
is implicit in the corresponding preference conditions. It should be noted, however, that those
axiomatizations do not apply to our framework, in particular, because the preference conditions
characterizing those weighting functions may not be well-deﬁned here. Also, Prelec (1998) and
Gonzalez and Wu (1999), in fact, model sensitivity to changes in the logarithm of probabilities
instead of probabilities as we do. From a technical point of view this is an important diﬀer-
ence as the interval of transformed probabilities (by taking the negative of the logarithm of
probabilities) is large enough (i.e., eguals all positive numbers) to generate endogenously, with
the appropriate axiom assumed, two regions in which changes in log-odds point in opposite
direction.4 We think that modeling sensitivity to probability changes is more natural under
RDU, certainly this is the case if one works in the general framework that we have adopted in
4The argument used here is best exempliﬁed for the case of, e.g., positive power functions that apply to
positive numbers. Assume that the power exceeds 1. For log-odds smaller than 1 applying the power function
leads to decreases of the original number, while application to log-odds larger than 1 results in increases. So, 1
naturally demarcates the regions of opposite sensitivity in log-odds.
29this paper.
By specifying exogenously the parameter separating sensitivity regions within the proba-
bility interval, we have also induced additional ﬂexibility for the representing functions. By
simply restricting some preference conditions to hold on particular subsets of the probability
interval, the resulting representing functionals belong to a much larger class than that of RDU-
preferences. That is, although we can obtain unique parametric weighting functions, in general
there may be two cardinal utility functions that govern choice behavior. Further, the number of
parameters that we get for the weighting functions –four– seems too large. To resolve these
issues we have employed additional condition s . T or e t a i nR D Uw i t hap a r a m e t r i ci n v e r s e - S
shaped weighting function we have introduced an axiom that explicitly requires consistency
of measured preferences irrespective of consequences. This then gives a single cardinal utility,
hence RDU. To reduce the number of parameters we assume diﬀerentiability of the weighting
function, which, although it seems a reasonable constraint, is enforced exogenously.
However, except for the parametrizations presented in this paper there are no other founda-
tions of RDU in the literature that combine parametric weighting functions and general utility.
The previous parametrizations either lack preference foundations or their preference founda-
tions are meaningful only in the special case of continuous utility. Neither is satisfactory. To
some extent we have been able to resolve these shortcomings. For example, we did this for the
one-parameter classes that we obtained. But, although progress has been made, our attempt
to add more empirical realism and still obtain simple classes of parametric weighting functions
compromises on other aspects. In particular, the problem of endogenizing the separation of the
probability interval into regions of distinct probabilistic risk attitudes or distinct sensitivity,
and thereby also reducing the number of parameters in the weighting functions (instead of
employing diﬀerentiability), remains an open question.
308 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3: That statement (i) implies statement (ii) follows from the speciﬁcf o r m
of the representing functional. Jensen-continuity, weak order, and comonotonic independence as
well as monotonicity follow immediate. Common ratio invariance for decumulative distributions
follows from substitution of the RDU-functional with power weighting function.
Next we prove that statement (ii) implies statement (i). Obviously statement (ii) in Theorem
2i ss a t i s ﬁed, hence, there exists an additively separable functional representing the preference
<. We restrict the attention to the case that p1 < 1a n dpn > 0t oa v o i dt h ep r o b l e mo fd e a l i n g
with unbounded V1,V n. To show that our additive functional in fact is a RDU form with power
weighting function we use results presented in Wakker and Zank (2002). Wakker and Zank did
not have the restrictions that p1 < 1a n dpn > 0 but permitted any non-negative rank-ordered
real numbers xi,i=1 ,...,nb e c a u s et h e yw o r k e di nas e t u pw i t hm o n e t a r yo u t c o m e si n s t e a d
of decumulative probabilities as we do here. But their results apply to our framework with
minor modiﬁcations, in particular the restriction p1 6 1 is not posing any diﬃculty. In their
Lemma A2 they derived a similar additive representation as we have in Theorem 2, and then in
their Lemma A3, using the analog of common ratio invariance for decumulative distributions,
they showed that their additive representation in fact is a RDU form with common positive
power function as “utility” and increasing “weighting function”. To apply their results we just
need to interchange the roles of utility and weighting function. Further, because the functions
Vj,j =1 ,...,n are proportional they can continuously be extended to 0 and 1 (this follows
from Wakker 1993, Proposition 3.5). Hence, we can conclude that there exist positive numbers
sj such that
Vj(pj)=sjw(pj),
31with w(p)=a + c(p)b, for some real a,b,c. Monotonicity and continuity imply that b,c are
positive, and requiring further that w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1 shows that a =0a n dc =1 .H e n c e ,
w(p)=pb is established. We deﬁne utility iteratively as u(x0)=0a n du(xj)=u(xj−1)+sj
for j =1 ,...,n. Therefore, Vj(pj)=w(pj)sj = pb
j[u(xj) − u(xj−1)] for j =1 ,...,n with
strictly monotonic utility u. We can conclude that the additive representation in Theorem 2 is
RDU with a power weighting function and monotonic utility. Therefore statement (i) has been
derived.
Uniqueness results follow from the joint cardinality of the functions Vj in Theorem 2, and
the fact that they are proportional. These properties translate into the weighting function being
unique because it assigns 0 to impossibility and 1 to certainty, and the utility being cardinal.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4: That statement (i) implies statement (ii) follows from the speciﬁc
form of the representing functional. Jensen-continuity, weak order, and comonotonic indepen-
dence as well as monotonicity follow immediate. Extreme replacement separability follows from
substitution of the RDU-functional with linear/exponential weighting function.
Next we prove that statement (ii) implies statement (i). As in the proof of Theorem 3,
statement (ii) in Theorem 2 is satisﬁed, hence, there exists an additively separable functional
representing the preference <. Attention is initially restricted to the case that p1 < 1a n d
pn > 0 to exclude unbounded V1 and Vn. To show that this additive functional is RDU with an
exponential weighting function we use results presented in Zank (2001). Zank did allow for non-
negative vectors with rank-ordered monetary outcomes in his Lemma 7 instead of probabilities
as we have here. However, those results apply to the case considered here if we interchange
the roles of utility and decision weights. Hence, we can conclude that in the representation of
32Theorem 2 the functions Vj are increasing exponential functions, i.e.,
Vj(p)=sj[aexp(cp)+b],
with ac > 0a n dsj > 0, and real b (or they are linearVj(p)=sj[ap + b]w i t ha>0). As
the functions are proportional, we can extend them continuously to all of [0,1] by Proposition
3.5 of Wakker (1993). We ﬁx scale and location of the otherwise jointly cardinal Vj, i.e.,





with c 6=0( o rVj(p)=sjp). We use the positive sj’s to deﬁne utility as u(x0)=0a n du(xj)=
u(xj−1)+sj for j =1 ,...,n. Therefore, the Vj’s are exponential or linear for j =1 ,...,nand
u is strictly monotonic. Hence, statement (i) has been derived.
Uniqueness results follow by similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3. This concludes
the proof of Theorem 4. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5: That statement (i) implies statement (ii) follows from the speciﬁc
form of the representing functional. Jensen-continuity, weak order, and comonotonic inde-
pendence as well as monotonicity follow immediate. Common ratio invariance for cumulative
distributions follows from substitution of the RDU-functional with dual power weighting func-
tion.
Next we prove that statement (ii) implies statement (i). Obviously statement (ii) in Theorem
2i ss a t i s ﬁed, hence, there exists an additively separable functional representing the preference
<. We restrict the attention to the case that p1 < 1a n dpn > 0 to avoid the problem of
dealing with unbounded V1,V n. To show that our additive functional is RDU with a dual
power weighting function we use, similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, results of Wakker and
Zank (2002). We deﬁne Wj(1 − pj)=Vj(1 − (1 − pj)) (= Vj(pj)) for j =1 ,...,n.T h e s e
33functions are decreasing in (1 − pj) and they give an additive representation as we have in
Theorem 2 but now on the set of cumulative distributions ˜ L.U s i n gL e m m aA 3o fW a k k e ra n d
Zank (2002) and common ratio invariance for cumulative distributions shows that this latter
additive representation is in fact a RDU form with common positive power weighting function
that is decreasing in cumulative probabilities. Further, because the functions Wj,j=1 ,...,n
are proportional they can continuously be extended to 0 and 1 (this follows from Wakker 1993,
Proposition 3.5). Hence, there exist positive numbers sj such that
Wj(1 − pj)=sj ˜ w(1 − pj)
= Vj(pj),
with ˜ w(1 − p)=a − c(1 − p)d,for some real a,c,d. Monotonicity and continuity imply that
c,d are positive, and requiring further that ˜ w(0) = 0 and ˜ w(1) = 1 shows that a =0a n d
c = 1. Hence, ˜ w(1 − p)=1− (1 − p)d is established, and we deﬁne utility iteratively as
u(x0)=0a n du(xj)=u(xj−1)+sj for j =1 ,...,n. Therefore, Vj(pj)=˜ w(1 − pj)sj =
˜ w(1 − pj)[u(xj) − u(xj−1)] for j =1 ,...,nwith strictly monotonic utility u.W ec a nc o n c l u d e
that the additive representation in Theorem 2 is RDU with dual a power weighting function
and monotonic utility. Therefore statement (i) has been derived.
Uniqueness results follow by similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3. This concludes
the proof of Theorem 5. ¤
Proof of Theorem 6: That statement (i) implies statement (ii) follows from the speciﬁc
form of the representing functional. Jensen-continuity, weak order, and comonotonic indepen-
dence as well as monotonicity follow immediate. For < restricted to Lˆ p (˜ Lˆ p), common ratio
invariance comes down to common ratio invariance for decumulative (cumulative) distribu-
tions and can easily be derived by substitution of the speciﬁc RDU-like functional as discussed
34following Theorem 6.
Next we prove that statement (ii) implies statement (i). Obviously statement (ii) in Theorem
2i ss a t i s ﬁed, hence, there exists an additively separable functional representing the preference
<. We restrict the attention to the case that p1 < 1a n dpn > 0 to avoid the problem of
dealing with unbounded V1,V n. Similarly to the proof of Theorems 3 and 5, we use the results
of Wakker and Zank (2002). The arguments used in the proof of Theorem 3 remain valid if we
restrict the analysis to probability distributions in Lˆ p. We can conclude that the Vj’s obtained
in Theorem 2 are proportional power functions for decumulative probabilities not exceeding ˆ p.
That is, there exist positive numbers sj such that
Vj(pj)=sjw(pj),
with w(p)=cpa, for some positive a and c.
Similarly, the arguments used in the proof of Theorem 5 remain valid if we restrict the
analysis to probability distributions in ˜ Lˆ p. We can conclude that the Vj’s obtained in Theorem
2 are proportional dual power functions for cumulative probabilities not exceeding 1− ˆ p.T h a t
is, there exist positive numbers ˆ sj such that
Vj(pj)=ˆ sjw(pj),
with w(p)=1− d(1 − p)b, for some positive d and b. Hence, statement (i) has been obtained.
Continuity at ˆ p implies that the parameters are related through c =1 /ˆ pa − d(1 − ˆ p)b/ˆ pa.
Uniqueness results follow from the joint cardinality of the functions Vj in Theorem 2, and the
fact that they are proportional. These properties translate into the weighting function being
unique because it assigns 0 to impossibility and 1 to certainty, and that the sj’s and ˆ sj’s can be
replaced only if re-scaled by a common positive number t. This concludes the proof of Theorem
6. ¤
35P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7 :The proof follows from Theorem 6 and the following arguments.
Suppose that I = {1,...,i} for some 1 <i<n ,a n df o rg i v e nˆ p take p>q ,and
γ<δsuch that pI(γ,... ,γ) ∼ ˆ pI(δ,...,δ), ˆ pI(γ,...,γ) ∼ qI(δ,... ,δ), and by consistency
pI\{i}ˆ pi(γ,... ,γ) ∼ ˆ pI\{i}qi(δ,... ,δ). Then, taking the ﬁrst and third indiﬀerence, substituting
the functional form described in statement (i) of Theorem 6, and subtracting the two equations,
we get
ˆ siw(p)+siw(q)=ˆ siw(ˆ p)+siw(ˆ p),
after cancelling common terms.






[ˆ sjw(ˆ p)+sjw(ˆ p)].
Therefore, for i =2 ,w eo b s e r v e
ˆ s2w(p)+s2w(q)=ˆ s2w(ˆ p)+s2w(ˆ p)
and
ˆ s1w(p)+s1w(q)+ˆ s2w(p)+s2w(q)=ˆ s1w(ˆ p)+s1w(ˆ p)+ˆ s2w(ˆ p)+s2w(ˆ p),
where, after substituting the ﬁrst equation in the latter and cancellation of common terms, we
get the equivalent equations
ˆ s2w(p)+s2w(q)=ˆ s2w(ˆ p)+s2w(ˆ p),













holds for all i =2 ,...,n.5 I fo n en o r m a l i z e st h ep o s i t i v esi’s and ˆ si’s such that they each
sum to one, which can always be done, one observes that si =ˆ si must hold. Therefore RDU
with a switch-power weighting function has been obtained. This shows that statement (ii)
of the theorem implies statement (i). The proof that statement (i) implies statement (ii)
follows immediate by substitution of the RDU-form with switch-powr weighting function, which
completes the proof of the theorem. ¤
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